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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NAFTA
LAW-SPRING UPDATE 2010
Olivia Howe

CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION

19 of the North American Free Trade Agreement

("NAFTA") provides an alternative forum for parties seeking judicial review of antidumping and countervailing duty orders from
the Court of International Trade.' Specifically, under article 1904(2)
these parties have the option to bring appeals before an independent
NAFTA Binational Panel instead of the national courts of the importing
country. 2 The panel acts in the place of national courts to decide whether
a previous determination regarding antidumping or countervailing duty
orders was made in accordance with the laws of the determining country.3
This article serves as a brief update of matters decided by the NAFTA
Binational Panel from January 2010 through May 2010.
11.

IN TH4E MATTLER OF STAINLESS STEEL SHEET AND
STRIP COILS FROM MEXICO

In this case, Respondents ThyssenKrupp Mexinox S.A. de C.V. and
Mexinox USA, Inc. ("Mexinox") requested that a Panel be convened to
review the Final Administrative Review Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in
Coils from Mexico that was issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce
("Commerce") under section 751 of the Tariff Act.4

A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Panel is to apply "the relevant statutes, legislative history, regulations, administrative practice, and judicial precedents" to the same degree
that the importing Party would if reviewing a final determination of the
investigating authority. 5 The application involves implementing the standard of review and legal principles that a court of the United States
would apply when reviewing a determination of its Department of Commerce. 6 This standard is set out in Section 516A(b)(1)(B) of the Tariff
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M
605, 683 [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. Id. art. 1904.2.
3. Id. art. 1904.1.
4. Tariff Act § 751, 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1999).
5. NAFFA, art. 1904.2.
6. Id. art. 1904.3.
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Act, and states that the reviewing authority must "hold unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found. ...to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with
law."17
The Panel must also look to the Congressional intent behind the statute
when it was written. If the statute is ambiguous, the Panel must determine if the "agency's construction of the statute is reasonable given the
express terms of the relevant statutory provision and the objectives of the
scheme as a whole."

B.
1.

IssuEs ARISING IN THE REVIEW

Whether Commerce's Application of Zeroing is Not Supported by
Substantial Evidence and/or is Not in Accordance with Law

Mexinox claimed that Commerce's use of zeroing is against American
law because no law exists "direct[ing] the DOC to apply zeroing in calculating dumping margins." It additionally claimed that if the law were
interpreted so that there was a question regarding zeroing, it should be
interpreted consistently with international obligations according to the
Charming Betsy doctrine where possible.' 0
Commerce, on the other hand, argued that the practice of zeroing is in
accordance with American law and has been upheld by the courts.' IIt
also argued that the Charming Betsy doctrine is inapplicable and that the
reviewing body should defer on matters of statutory interpretation according to Chevron.12 The Panel ultimately had to determine whether
the Commerce's "interpretation of 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35) [wa]s permissible
under American antidumping duty law."113
a.

The Statute

The Panel determined that Commerce's interpretation of the statute
excluded positive value sales in direct contradiction to the wording of the
statute that specifically requires Commerce to employ a "methodology
which analyzes all sales."'14 It also determined that the agency's interpretation goes against the purpose of the statute to "accurately determine
dumping margins" by eliminating sales that should be counted and distorting the dumping averages.'15 The Panel also found several WVTO deci7. Tariff Act § 516A(b)(1)(B), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1) (2006).
8. NAFTrA Binational Panel Report, In the Matter of- Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip
in Coils from Mexico: Final Results of 200412005 Antidumping Review, USAMEX-2007-1904-01,2 (Apr. 14, 2010), available at http://registry.nafta-sec-alena.
orglcm docu ments/edce70 c-9720-424b-b232-1 fd71431 8ba.pdf.
9. Id. at 3.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 4.
14. NAFTrA Binational Panel Report, supra note 8, at 6.
15. Id.
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sions persuasive which "held that the use of zeroing is inconsistent with
US obligations under the WTO Agreement."116
b.

Chevron and Charming Betsy Are Not Mutually Exclusive

The Panel then determined that the U.S. Supreme Court cases Charming Betsy and Chevron did not conflict and that thus, they are not mutually exclusive. It first recalled that courts should examine Congressional
intent and compare this with the way the agency interpreted the law, giving deference to agency interpretations. 17 If the Congressional intent is
not clear the court must determine whether the agency had a "permissible construction of the statute."' 8 The Panel also recalled that under
Charming Betsy a law should not be construed to "violate the laws of
nations if any other construction remains." 1 9 Therefore, an interpretation
that is permissible under Chevron may violate U.S. international legal

obligations and so be contrary to the

law. 20

The relevant international obligation in this case was determined to be
"the obligation of the U.S. under the Antidumping Agreement to make
'fair comparisons' in determining dumping margins."12' Specifically, the
Panel found that WITO Agreements are considered international legal
obligations and presumed that Congress intended statutes to comply with

these Agreements . 2 2

c. U.S. Legislation Does Not Prevent the Application of Charming
Betsy
The Panel then determined that U.S. Legislation allows for the application of Charming Betsy. Contrary to the view of Commerce, the Panel
found that the Uruguay Round Agreements Act is partially inapplicable
because 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a) is limited to statutes, and the legislation does
not prevent the Panel from applying the Charming Betsy doctrine. 23 Instead, the doctrine requires the panel "to assess agency actions, in light of
American international obligations."12 4 The Panel pointed out that sections 123 and 129 of the URAA "establish a statutory scheme for dealing
with WTO determinations."12 5 But, it held that neither was applicable in
this case because zeroing is not a regulation or practice and the U.S. has
consistently shown its commitment to upholding international

obligations .2 6
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

21.
22.

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7 (quoting Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804)).
NAFTA Binational Panel Report, supra note 8, at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id at 9.
Id.
Id.
NAFTA Binational Panel Report, supra note 8, at 9.
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d.

Timken and Corus Do Not Preclude a Remand

The Panel then noted the existence of two competing liens of jurisprudence at the Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit relating
to "the relevance of WVTO jurisprudence to judicial review."12 7 The Panel
determined that it was free to follow either line of authorities as the issue
had not been resolved at the Federal Circuit level; thus, the Panel could
examine international jurisprudence for guidance. 2 8 It decided that both
the Timken and Corus cases were distinguishable from the case at hand
and that because of this, the available jurisprudence did not preclude a
remand. 2 9 Ultimately, the Panel remanded back to Commerce on this
issue to calculate the dumping margins of Mexinox without zeroing. 30
2.

Whether Commerce's Adjustments to the U.S. Indirect Selling
Expense Ratio are Not in Accordance with Law

The Panel next examined the calculation of service fees by both Mexinox and Commerce. It determined that Mexinox failed to carry its burden of showing "how the service fee amounts were calculated and why
these amounts accurately reflect the indirect selling expenses."13 ' It concluded that Commerce erred by "reject[ing] the fee revenue as an offset
to the selling expenses, yet [using] the same rejected fee amounts as an
allocation factor," effectively double-counting selling expenses. 3 2 Therefore, the Panel rejected both Mexinox original calculation and Commerce 's recalculation of service fees. 3 3 The Panel also remanded to
Commerce on this issue with instructions "to recalculate the indirect selling expense ratio" according to the alternative method of calculation proposed by Mexinox. 3 4
3.

Whether Commerce's Adjustments to the Net FinancialExpenses
Ratio are Not Supported by Substantial Evidence and/or are
Not in Accordance with Law

The Panel then examined three adjustments that Commerce made to
the financial expense ratio calculations.
a.

Commerce Rejected Mexinox's Claimed Reduction to Interest
Expenses for "Other Interest Income"

First, the Panel agreed with Commerce that Mexinox failed to produce
the information necessary to show that its "income consisted of shortterm interest from the investment of working capital" as required by the
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 13.

31. Id. at

14.

32. NAFTFA Binational Panel Report, supra note 8, at 15.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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Department of Commerce's regulations. 35 By only providing "a short excerpt from an accounting manual," Mexinox failed to meet its burden. 3 6
Therefore, Commerce's decision to reject the offset for interest income
requested by Mexinox was affirmed by the Panel. 37
b.

Commerce Included Expenses Described as "Miscellaneous Net
Financial Expenses" in the Calculation of the Financial
Expense Ratio

TePanel also agreed with Commerce's decision to include gains and
losses in its financial expense calculation. 3 8 It found Mexinox's arguments about factoring receivables to be irrelevant. 3 9 The Panel determined that according to relevant legislation, the normal administrative
practice of Commerce, and substantial evidence, it was proper for Commerce to include "miscellaneous net financial expenses" in its Financial
Expense Calculation. 40
c. Commerce used Packing Costs and Cost of Sales Data to
Estimate the Amount of Packing Expenses Included in
the Cost of Sales Denominator in Order to
Calculate the Financial Expense Ratio
Though Mexinox agreed that Commerce should exclude packing expenses when calculating the financial expense rate, it disagreed as to how
Commerce should make this calculation. 4 1 Because Mexinox did not give
Commerce the actual packing costs, and Commerce used a reasonable
and "accepted common methodology" to make the calculation, the Panel
deferred to Commerce's calculation. 4 2 Therefore, the Panel also upheld
the adjustments Commerce made to the Net Financial Expenses Ratio. 43
4.

Whether Commerce's Level of Trade ("LOT") Analysis Was
Supported by Substantial Evidence and Was in Accordance
with Law.
a. Commerce's Level of Trade Analysis is Consistent with the
Antidumping Statute.
The Panel examined 19 U.S.C. § 1677a and determined that Commerce
correctly "beg[an] its analysis with the starting price to the first unaffiliated purchaser and deduct[ed] the expenses incurred between importation and resale."14 4 The Panel also approved of Commerce's second step
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id at 16.
Id
Id.
NAFTA Binational Panel Report, supra note 8, at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id.
NAFTA Binational Panel Report, supra note 8, at 20.
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of examining "selling functions remaining in the CEP transaction data
after deduction of subsection (d) expenses and examin[ing] the data on
the NV side for evidence of similar selling functions" as set forth in Torrington.4 5 Finally, the Panel determined that Commerce correctly
granted a CEP offset in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1677 b(a)(7)(A), 19
C.F.R. § 351.412 (b) and (d), and 19 C.F.R. § 351.412(d) and (f).4 6 Thus,
the Panel found that Commerce's analysis and subsequent CEP offset
were correctly made using methodology that was based on legislation and
the administrative practice of Commerce . 47
b.

The Department's Administrative Practice and Substantial
Evidence of Commerce's Level of Trade Analysis

When conducting its trade analysis, Commerce's "beg[an] with the
starting price to the first unaffiliated purchaser and then deduct[ed] from
it the expenses incurred between importation and resale;" it subsequently
codified this practice." 8 Commerce pointed out that this practice is supported by the Court of International Trade in Torrington.4 9 It then "examine~d] selling functions and determine[d] if the functions performed in
the CEP transaction are similar to the data on the Normal Value side."150
The Panel found that Commerce put its practice into law and applied it
in several cases. 51 It additionally concluded that Commerce's conclusion
was in line with other administrative reviews of this case . 52 Based on this
practice and the data submitted by Mexinox, Commerce had concluded
that there was one LOT in the home market. 53 The Panel affirmed Commerce's determination on the Level of Trade after determining that Commerce's analysis was consistent with both legislation and substantial
evidence and was in line with its typical administrative practice. 5"
5.

Whether Commerce's Treatment of Mexinox's Inventory Carrying
Costs for Certain of its U.S. Inventory (Channel 3) as
Indirect Selling Expenses Is Not Supported by
Substantial Evidence

Mexinox's sales to unaffiliated customers, or Channel 3 sales, involved
inventory carrying costs that Commerce determined were indirect selling
expenses.5 5 The Domestic Industry felt these sales should be treated as
direct U.S. selling expenses because they relate to sales to U.S. customers
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id.
NAFTA Binational Panel Report, supra note 8, at 21.
Id at 22
Id.
Id
Id. at 23.
Id
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and are consignment inventories. 5 6 Commerce, on the other hand, argued that it had discretion in deciding how to classify indirect selling expenses. 5 7 Mexinox agreed with Commerce that there was substantial
evidence in support of Commerce's findings and argued that the Domestic Industry failed to recognize the fact that Commerce typically treats
carrying costs as indirect selling expenses. 5 8
The Panel first agreed that Commerce has discretion when making a
decision on how to treat indirect selling expenses and does not have to
consider the geographical location of the sales in making its classification.5 9 Thus, it found Commerce was correct to abide by its typical procedures and classify pre-sale expenses as indirect selling expenses. 6 0 The
Panel then found substantial evidence to support Commerce's determination that the inventory carrying expenses were incurred pre-sale. 6 1
Therefore, the Panel found it reasonable for Commerce to treat the inventory carrying costs as indirect selling expenses and upheld Commerce's treatment of the inventory carrying costs of Mexinox. 6 2
6.

Dissent

The dissenting opinion began by reviewing the arguments of both Mexinox and Commerce, including the debate regarding the application of
the Chevron test and the Charming Betsy canon of statutory interpretation.63 The dissent also applied Chevron but contrary to the majority
Panel decision, found that 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35) is ambiguous, a fact
which gives rise to the deference that is to be shown to the agency determination. 64 It found this point further exemplified by decisions of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and lower court decisions
that found 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35) to be ambiguous. 6 5
The dissent found the primary issue to be whether Commerce was reasonable in the use of its methodology as set out in Charming Betsy. 66
Further, it disagreed with the majority's use of cases finding that the majority applied distinguishable or completely irrelevant cases and selectively quoted Charming Betsy such that it applied an incomplete
standard. 6 7 The dissent also determined that Charming Betsy was not applicable in the way that the majority used it, and that if it was not applicable, then "the Timken and Corus Staal lines of cases are controlling,
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

NAFTA Binational Panel Report, supra note 8, at 23-24.
Id at 24.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id at 26.
Id
NAFTA Binational Panel Report, supra note 8, at 26.
Id. at 27-28.
Id at 28-29.
Id at 29.
Id.
Id. at 29-30.
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binding precedent and must be followed by the Panel here."16 8 In the
alternative, the dissent found that even if the precedents of the Federal
Circuit are not binding, the cases should be more persuasive than those
used by the majority to support its reasoning; thus, Commerce's decision
to use zeroing should be upheld. 69 The dissent then went on to explain its
view "that when there is a clear conflict between a treaty and Congress'
implementation of that treaty. ...the contemporaneous or subsequent legislation rules."17 0
Section three of the majority opinion was then addressed. According
to the dissent, the majority ignored the fact that it was to evaluate "the
use by Commerce in a particular administrative review of its calculation
of the anti-dumping duties during the period of the review applicable to
imports from Mexinox by a particular zeroing methodology, no more and
no less."17 1 Thus, any arguments on the internal obligations of the United
States in relation to WTO dispute resolution reports should have been
subject to only section 129 of the URAA and not section 123.72
The dissent also took issue with the majority's treatment of WTO0 Panel
and Appellate Body reports as binding. 73 It stated that the applicable law
for "the United States' international obligations under the WTO AntiDumping Agreement is what United States law says are its obligations,
not what a WTO Panel or the Appellate Body says are United States
obligations."17 4 If the international obligation is a non-self-executing
treaty, however, the dissent found the obligations of the treaty are what
Congresses states they are when passing the legislation. 7 5 In situations
involving anti-dumping, the authority to interpret the statute has been
delegated to the Department of Commerce. 7 6 Because 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(35) does not permit or forbid zeroing, Commerce therefore gets to
choose its methodology so long as it does not conflict with Congress's
direction.7 7 The dissent further explained that according to Whitney, U.S.
courts ruling on non-self-executing treaties are to look to the statute incorporating the treaty into U.S. law and if the statute is unclear, and its
interpretation has been delegated to an agency, the court must examine
the agency's interpretation for its reasonableness. 78
The dissent then analyzed the Medellin case to determine "what effect
to give under domestic law to decisions of international decision makers
making determinations in a dispute resolution system set up by a treaty to
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

NAFTA Binational Panel Report, supra note 8, at 30.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id

73.

Id. at

32.

74. NAFTA Binational Panel Report, supra note 8, at 32.

75. Id. at 33.
76. Id.
77. Id.

78. Id. at 35.
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which the U.S. has adhered."17 9 Based on the reasoning in that case, the
dissent found that "dispute resolution reports under the DSU interpreting the treaties do not have domestic legal effect and do not constitute
international obligations subject to the Charming Betsy canon."180 Instead, the reports should act as interpretative guides in domestic law
when evaluating the actions of the agency. 8' Therefore, according to the
dissent, the Panel is required to accept the interpretation of Commerce
unless it is forbidden by the United States domestic statute. 8 2 It found
that Commerce's interpretation is not patently forbidden by 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(35).83 Thus, the dissent found that,
to attempt to use the Charming Betsy to assert that this Panel must
remand to Commerce its determination in the administrative review
under consideration for decision without zeroing because the Appellate Body of the DSU has declared zeroing to be illegal is simply a
complete misunderstanding of the requirements of United States
law, and upheld Commerce's use of zoning.8 4
The dissent also pointed out that many Federal judges have examined
the statute and found it ambiguous. 85 Therefore, it found Commerce was
justified in interpreting the statute in the way that it did and that there
was "absolutely no justification for this Panel to start anew, as if those
decisions did not exist, and make a de novo determination that the statute

is clear and unambiguous."18 6

Ultimately the dissent felt that the majority chose its own vision of
what the law was instead of following what was actually enacted by Congress. 8 7 It found this to be improper and stated that "the decision of
Commerce to apply zeroing should be affirmed."188

79. Id.

at 37.

80. NAFFA Binational Panel Report, supra note 8, at 38.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 40.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 41.
85. Id at 42.
86. NAFTA Binational Panel Report, supra note 8, at 42.
87. Id. at 43.
88. Id. at 46.
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